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Intra-Party Democracy and  
Responsiveness to Rival Parties’ Policies 
 
Objective: We address whether intraparty democracy conditions political parties’ responsiveness to rival parties’ 
policy shifts.  
 
Method: We estimate parameters of a spatial econometric model of parties’ policy positions in eleven established 
democracies.  
 
Results:  Internally democratic parties respond to shifts in rival parties’ policies, and internally undemocratic 
parties do not respond rival parties’ policy shifts.  
 
Conclusion: We argue that this occurs because intra-party deliberation provides a channel through which rival 
parties influence their competitors’ policies. Because rank-and-file party members are influenced by deliberative 
processes more than party leaders, and the policy goals of internally democratic parties’ policies are heavily 
influenced by their party members – deliberative processes lead democratic parties to respond to shifts in rival 
parties’ policy positions. This work has important implications for our understanding of parties’ election 
strategies, intra-party politics, and how policies diffuse between parties competing in the same election. 
 
Keywords: party policy positions, intra-party democracy, spatial model, diffusion 
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Spatial theory suggests that parties respond to the median voter and that rival parties’ policy positions will 
also influence parties’ positions (e.g., Downs, 1957; Cox, 1990; Roemer, 2001). Several studies present empirical 
evidence that support these expectations, namely, that parties respond to the median (Adams et al., 2004, 2006; 
Downs, 1957; Erikson et al., 2002; McDonald and Budge, 2005; Budge et al., 2012; Soroka and Wlezien, 2010), 
and that parties are also responsive to rival parties’ policy positions (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009a, Williams, 
2015; Williams and Whitten, 2015; see also Williams et al., 2015).  
Lehrer (2012) and Schumacher et al. (2013) extend this research by introducing the notion that the 
responsiveness to the median is conditional on party-level characteristics (see also Adams et al., 2006; Ezrow et 
al., 2011):1 specifically, the internal organization of political parties conditions how they respond to public 
opinion. Political parties are more responsive to their core supporters when their internal organization is more 
democratic, and, on the other hand, more receptive to the median voter at the expense of their supporters when 
their organization is undemocratic (Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013). In the following, we refer to parties 
with internal democracy as “democratic parties” and to parties without it as “undemocratic parties”. 
We combine research on party responsiveness and party organization with the research on deliberation 
(e.g., Dryzek, 1990, 2000, 2010; Manin, 1987; Cohen, 1989; Habermas, 1996; Benhabib, 1996; Bohman and 
Rehg, 1997; Elster, 1998; Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012) to develop a novel insight about how political parties 
respond to rival political parties in multi-party systems. As an ideal type, deliberation is a process of public 
reasoning, in which a fair and equal setting invites all actors to participate in a decision-making and discourse 
process for identifying preferences, positions, or policies all can agree on (Bohman, 1998; Fung, 2003; Goodin 
and Dryzek, 2006; Rosenberg, 2007; Goodin, 2008; Dryzek, 2010; Niemeyer, 2011). This concept is based on 
Dahl’s (1971: 4) idea of inclusiveness that varies with “the proportion of the population entitled to participate on a 
more or less equal plane in controlling and contesting the conduct of the government.” Ultimately, this process 
makes it possible to reach consensus on, or at least a better understanding of pertinent political principles (see also 
Böhmelt et al., 2016a).  
In light of our understanding of deliberation, we argue that democratic parties are more likely to mirror 
deliberative ideas and, thus, respond more strongly to rival political parties than undemocratic parties. We argue 
that this is due, in part, to the information that influences core supporters, who are the same constituency that 
ultimately influences the policy platforms of democratic parties. Intra-party democracy not only determines 
whether rank-and-file members can hold party elites accountable (Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013), but it 
also facilitates the process of deliberative participation and decision-making, which promotes the free flow of 
ideas, focuses the intra-party debate, and provides opportunities for learning and emulation that ultimately 
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influence party policy platforms (see Böhmelt et al., 2016a). It is then more likely that outside influences such as 
rival parties’ policy positions become part of the deliberative discourse of a party and, eventually, affect its 
position.2  
We find empirical support for our argument that intra-party democracy enhances responsiveness to rival 
parties, using spatial econometric methods on data from eleven Western European democracies between 1977 and 
2010. The results are robust to a series of additional empirical tests and specification changes in the research 
design. This research has crucial implications for our understanding of political representation and parties’ 
election strategies. While political representation, from one point of view, is enhanced when parties adopt clear 
and distinct policy positions that reflect their sub-constituents’ interests (Mair, 2008), from another angle, parties 
that adopt rival parties’ policies are likely to represent more than one sub-constituency (see also Ezrow et al., 
2011). Our results imply that there are a number of factors – for example, the internal organization of political 
parties, the median voter, and rival parties – that affect how parties represent citizens’ political preferences 
(Müller 2000; Powell 2000). Second, we contribute to the literature on parties’ election strategies (see, e.g., 
Alvarez, Nagler, and Bowler, 2000; Budge, 1994; Budge et al., 2012; Dow, 2001, 2011; Erikson and Romero, 
1990; Kedar, 2005; Laver, 2005; Somer-Topcu, 2009), by showing that parties are more responsive to rival parties 
if they are (internally) democratic. 
To this end, our work contributes to the literature on comparative political communication. As elaborated 
in the introduction to this special issue, scholars have long called for greater attention to comparative political 
communication, i.e., to think carefully about how institutional, political, economic, and cultural context structures 
what is said, to whom, and with what effect. Only recently, however, have scholars been able to take advantage of 
unique data sources and better analytic techniques to effectively pursue this. While conventional wisdom and most 
of the literature mostly focuses on communication from elites to the public or from elites to the media to the 
public, our work is instead about how parties “communicate” or learn from one other. However, we not only 
demonstrate both theoretically and empirically that this occurs, but that whether and how it happens depends on 
the institutional context, i.e., intra-party (democratic) structures. 
 
Theoretical Argument 
We develop our theory along the following lines. First, parties in multi-party systems compete under 
uncertainty in terms of how voters and other parties will respond to a new party policy position (Budge, 1994). 
Second, party elites can address this uncertainty by collecting information from polls, focus groups, or private 
conversations. However, rank-and-file members rarely have access to this information (Cross and Blais, 2012: 
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150), and instead they act on more public information from the media and from discussing policy with others. The 
importance of the latter point, namely, deliberation, has been researched extensively (see Bohman, 1998; Fung, 
2003; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; Rosenberg, 2007; Goodin, 2008; Dryzek, 2010; Niemeyer, 2011).  Finally, 
democratic parties’ policy positions reflect rank-and-file members’ interests and information because these 
members influence the leadership, while undemocratic parties’ policy positions instead reflect party elites’ 
interests and their information (Müller and Strøm, 1999; Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013; Cross and Katz, 
2013). In turn, we claim that in undemocratic parties, party elites choose policy positions that will be influenced 
by a number of factors other than rival parties’ positions as they rely on information from polls, focus groups, or 
private conversations. In democratic parties, rank-and-file members without access to that information can hold 
the leadership accountable and thereby have more influence over it. Thus, deliberative processes open a channel 
through which rival parties’ policy positions can affect a focal party’s policy. Rank-and-file members in 
democratic parties and, therefore, their parties will be more responsive to rival parties’ positions, while 
undemocratic parties will be less receptive to rival’s policies.  
In the following, we discuss in detail how intra-party democracy empowers party members at the expense 
of party elites, and how this gives rise to a more deliberative environment in which rival parties’ policy positions 
are likely to influence party policy. 
 
Uncertainty and Undemocratic Parties 
Our argument applies to multi-party systems as there are higher levels of uncertainty in these systems 
about election outcomes and government formation due to the larger number of competitors. Conversely, elections 
and government formation in two-party systems are relatively more predictable using public opinion polls, since 
competition for votes and office is competition for the political center ground (Downs, 1957; Roemer, 2001). In 
multi-party systems, votes matter, yet distance to rival parties matters in coalition bargaining as well (Schofield, 
1993), which makes choosing a (nearly) optimal policy position more complicated.  
To cope with this uncertainty, party elites who are interested in winning elections and participating in 
government (Robertson, 1976; Cross and Blais, 2012: 143) seek information, independent of rival parties’ policy 
positions, on how voters and rival parties might respond to alternative policy positions they could adopt. To obtain 
information on voters’ responses to these alternative policy positions, parties frequently present their new policy 
ideas to a sample of voters, e.g., in surveys or focus groups. These voters report their feelings and beliefs about 
alternative policies, and parties then make inferences about the new policies’ electoral prospects.3 In terms of 
predicting government formation after elections, party elites rely on private conversations between several parties’ 
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elites. In these discussions, they lay out their parties’ goals, bliss points, and potential concessions they are willing 
to make to form a government.4 By possessing this information, party elites are able to make informed decisions 
because they can assess alternative policy positions’ electoral consequences and implications for government 
formation (see also Cross and Blais, 2012: 150). This implies that party elites are influenced most prominently by 
surveys, focus groups, and post-election coalition calculations. 
Whether party elites’ knowledge is used to formulate policies, however, critically hinges on who chooses 
the party leader – and this is the point where it matters whether a party is democratic or not.5 If the party 
leadership is chosen by party elites, their selectorate is relatively small and undemocratic because a vast share of 
the membership does not participate in the selection process. As Lehrer (2012) argues, undemocratic parties are 
not constrained by their members’ policy preferences to pursue office or electoral goals when setting policy 
positions (see also Schumacher et al., 2013). Party elites can directly implement their private information 
independent of rival parties’ policies that they anticipate will help them in the next election. A different 
mechanism applies to democratic parties. 
 
Democratic Parties and Deliberation 
If the party leadership is chosen with the participation of rank-and-file members, e.g., at a party conference 
to which local party branches send a majority of delegates or in a one-member-one-vote election, a party 
leadership’s selectorate is more democratic. Müller and Strøm (1999: 18) argue that a democratic leadership’s 
selectorate “may promote policy orientation at the expense of office benefits, since leaders must show greater 
concern for the policy preferences of their followers” (see also Aldrich, 1983; Bäck, 2008; Lehrer, 2012; 
Schumacher et al., 2013; Meyer, 2013). While party elites can set the policy position in undemocratic parties 
without membership constraints, rank-and-file members effectively set the policy position in democratic parties, 
because they can constrain leaders by holding them accountable. 
We argue that internally more democratic parties are more deliberative in that party members’ demand for 
policy positions is shaped by a process of deliberation, in contrast to party elites’ demand that is shaped by the 
information they obtain elsewhere (see above). Deliberation is a process of public reasoning, in which the fair and 
equal setting induces citizens to look beyond their immediate self-interest to justify their preferences in terms that 
all can in principle accept (Bohman, 1998; Fung, 2003; Goodin and Dryzek, 2006; Rosenberg, 2007; Goodin, 
2008; Dryzek, 2010; Niemeyer, 2011). By persuasion, deliberation can lead to consensus on pressing political 
aspects (Böhmelt et al., 2016a).  
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Intra-party democracy is associated with more deliberation as it moves party leadership campaigns from 
the party backroom, where party elites with similar preferences for office and votes debate policies, to the public 
sphere (Cross and Blais, 2012: 136). First, deliberation counteracts the domination of specific, narrowly defined 
interests (e.g., votes, office, or party core ideology), opening up room for other-regarding, generalizable interests 
and (Dryzek, 2000). Ideas, concepts, and policy positions from other parties may not be an exception here. In fact, 
deliberation should make it more likely that these “outside positions” actually become part of the intra-party 
discourse and, eventually, influence the focal party’s position.6 Second, deliberation also focuses on the general 
political debate (i.e., rival parties’ arguments and media reports), brings together information, and provides 
opportunities for social learning, all of which can make it more likely that the focal party becomes more receptive 
to other ideas, including from rival parties (Niemeyer, 2004; Parkinson and Mansbridge, 2012). 
In sum, these arguments suggest that deliberation may help open the party to external voices, although they 
may not particularly be open to dialogue in many instances (see Meadowcroft, 2004). Hence, in a more 
democratically organized party, deliberation takes place and there is a higher chance of all points of view being 
considered – including rival parties’ policy positions (see Böhmelt et al., 2016b). Finally, if a working consensus 
is achieved in a deliberative, more democratic party, it is less likely that the party elites can just ignore what has 
gone on at the “base” (Meadowcroft, 2004; Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013). The above considerations lead 
to the following expectation: 
Democratic Party Hypothesis: Internally democratic parties are more responsive to rival parties’ policy 
shifts than internally undemocratic parties.  
 
Research Design 
Parties’ Policy Positions and Rank-and-File Participation 
To test the hypothesis, we assembled a data set of 379 parties in eleven countries between 1977 and 2010. 
We only consider parties competing in party systems with at least three effective parliamentary parties (Gallagher 
and Mitchell, 2008). The unit of analysis is the party-election year. Both our dependent variable and our central 
explanatory variable rely on measurements of parties’ policy positions. For these measures, we use the left-right 
scale at elections as captured by the Manifesto Research on Political Representation (MARPOR, Budge et al., 
2001; Klingemann et al., 2006; Volkens et al., 2015). There are multiple reasons for using this measure. First, the 
left-right dimension is a widely applicable classification scheme of policy preferences across time and space, 
which has been measured for parties as well as voters. Second, the issues addressed by the left-right scale are the 
underlying conflicts of Western societies and, hence, their base of political competition (Huber and Powell, 1994; 
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Powell, 2000; McDonald and Budge, 2005). Third, the MARPOR data, which are based on specially trained 
coders’ classifications of parties’ manifesto statements, correlate well with other measures of party positions such 
as expert placements, citizens’ perceptions, or parliamentary voting (Hearl, 2001; McDonald and Mendes, 2001; 
Laver, Benoit, and Garry, 2003; see also Marks et al., 2007). Finally, MARPOR data’s broad coverage of 
countries across time enables us to study patterns of party competition using a relatively large data set. Our 
dependent variable is a party’s rescaled7 MARPOR score.  
Our central explanatory variables are Intra-Party Democracy and rival parties’ policy positions. First, we 
measure Intra-Party Democracy as rank-and-file members’ ability to select the party leader. In particular, we rely 
on data by Katz and Mair (1990), Cross and Blais (2012), and Pilet and Cross (2014).8 Whenever these sources 
indicate that a party leader is chosen by either a one-member-one-vote election or a party conference to which 
local party branches send delegates to, we code a party as democratic. In all other cases, which include MPs or a 
small group of party elites choosing the party leader, we classify the party as being undemocratic.9 The next 
section discusses our spatial-econometrics approach in detail, before we explain how we measure other parties’ 
influences on the focal party’s policy position and the control variables. 
 
Methodology and Measurement of Rival Parties’ Policy Positions 
Following recent developments in the empirical literature on party competition (Williams, 2015; Williams 
and Whitten, 2015; Williams et al., 2015; Böhmelt et al., 2016b), we estimate spatial temporal autoregressive 
models or “spatial lag models” (Franzese and Hays, 2007, 2008). They are able to capture the spatial dependence 
among party positions directly. Our baseline model is defined by: 
                     yt=fye-1+r0Wye-1+r1[Wye-1* Intra-Party Democracy]+bXt-1+e,                 
where a party‘s policy position at time t (i.e., election e), yt, is a function of its policy position at the previous 
election, ye-1, a vector of controls with data from the year before the election took place, Xt-1 (specified below), and 
e is the error term. Wye-1 is a by W weighted function of other parties’ MARPOR policy positions at the last 
election, i.e., the spatial lag. In our setup, we refer to E as the number of elections in our sample for a specific 
party. W is a matrix with E NxN sub-matrices along the block diagonal in which wij specifies the connection 
between parties i and j, and wii=0. For the spatial lag, W assigns all domestic competitors of the focal party a value 
of 1 and 0 otherwise.10 Wye-1 is the product of this connectivity matrix and the policy positions of all other parties 
in the previous election. We do not row-standardize the connectivity matrix (Plümper and Neumayer, 2010) as we 
assume that the amount of attention the focal party pays to other parties does depend on the number of rival 
parties (Williams, 2015; Williams and Whitten, 2015; Williams et al., 2015; Böhmelt et al., 2016b). 
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When a spatial connectivity matrix is not row-standardized, however, the interpretation of marginal effects 
becomes more complex as the spatial lag tends to increase with the number of domestic rivals. Plümper and 
Neumayer (2010: 430f) argue that a meaningful marginal effect is obtained when multiplying the spatial lag’s 
coefficient by the average number of rivals a party has. Here, a party has 6.6 rivals on average and we have 
modified the marginal effects reported below accordingly. 
Finally, to directly test the “heterogeneity in responsiveness” (Neumayer and Plümper, 2012: 833-835) to 
rival parties’ policy positions, we interact the spatial lag with Intra-Party Democracy. Ultimately, we focus on 
three variables as our core explanatory items (Golder et al., 2006; Neumayer and Plümper, 2012): Intra-Party 
Democracy, Wye-1, and their multiplicative specification. 
 
Control Variables 
We include a series of control variables that primarily address alternative determinants of party policy 
positions and may be correlated with intra-party democracy. First, the median voter position generally influences 
party positions (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009a; Williams, 2015). We, therefore, include a measure for the 
(running) median voter (Tuckey, 1977) that is based on survey data. Respondents are asked to place themselves 
on a left-right scale. We use these respondents’ answers, recode them to a 1-10 scale that matches the rescaled 
MARPOR scale, and compute from them the election year median for the countries in our sample. Whenever 
available, we rely on Eurobarometer surveys (Schmitt and Scholtz, 2005); in case these are not available, we 
employ national election studies (e.g., from the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems). The Eurobarometer 
data enable us to include a one-year lagged measure of the median position as these surveys are conducted every 
year; information obtained from the national election studies are based on contemporary data.11 
Second, intra-party democracy is linked to party members’ ability to pull party policy toward their ideal 
position (Lehrer, 2012; Schumacher et al., 2013). To control for this effect, we add party supporters’ median 
position to our models.12 Using the same survey data as above, we computed Tuckey’s (1977) running median of 
all survey respondents’ self-placements on the left-right scale who indicated to vote for the corresponding party. 
Third, Ward et al. (2011) argue that economic openness and globalization constrain parties’ ability to take 
radical policy positions. For addressing this mechanism, we add the one-year lagged economic component of 
Dreher’s (2006) Globalization Index. We also interact it with our measure of the median voter to capture Ward et 
al.’s (2011) argument that the strength of the economic constraint depends on the position of the median voter. 
Fourth, we include party as well as year fixed effects. These binary variables are needed to rule out that the 
effects we report are due to common exposure, i.e., the “reverse Galton’s problem” (Buhaug and Gleditsch, 2008: 
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216) – clustering that results from other processes than spatial competition. The year fixed effects address 
common shocks that all parties face in a given year (e.g., an economic recession). The party fixed effects control 
for time-invariant party-specific characteristics. Finally, the lagged dependent variable allows parties’ past 
behavior to affect the current policy position.13 Together, the lagged dependent variable, the lagged covariates, as 
well as the fixed effects help to ensure that reported effects are due to a genuine spatial competition process. 
Given this setup, we expect the coefficient on the spatial lag for undemocratic parties, r0, to be small in 
magnitude and statistically insignificant. Conversely, we expect that the joint marginal of effect of r0 and r1, i.e., 
the coefficient on the interaction between the spatial lag and Intra-Party Democracy, to be positive and 
statistically significant. 
[Table 1 here]  
 
Empirical Results 
The findings are summarized in Table 1. The average instantaneous marginal effects of interest (i.e., the 
marginal effects of the spatial lag as well as the joint effects of its interaction variables) cannot directly be derived 
from this table. Instead, we calculated them and display these in Figure 1 (next to the corresponding 90 percent 
confidence intervals). This graph indicates average marginal effects as discussed in Plümper and Neumayer 
(2010: 430f). The left estimate reveals that the effect of rival parties’ policy positions at the previous election does 
not assert a statistically significant effect on parties’ policy positions in undemocratic parties. The right estimate 
demonstrates that rival parties’ past positions affect parties’ positions when democratic. This provides us with 
initial evidence in favor of the Democratic Party Hypothesis. 
[Figure 1 here] 
Note that Figure 1 cannot establish whether the effects for democratic and undemocratic parties are 
statistically significantly different from one another. This is because the Type I error rate of comparing two 90 
percent confidence intervals is approximately 0.02, which is too conservative for comparing the difference in 
effects given our sample size (Payton et al., 2003). Instead, we refer to Table 1 that reports coefficients together 
with standard errors on Wy e-1*Intra-Party Democracy, which indicate that the difference in effect size is indeed 
statistically significant (p=.083). This is additional support for the Democratic Party Hypothesis. 
In terms of substantive relevance, consider the average democratic party competing in multi-party systems 
with its 6.6 neighbors. If all of its rivals position themselves one unit further to the right (i.e., Wye-1 increases by 
6.6 units), ceteris paribus, then democratic parties are predicted to shift instantaneously by 0.15 units (90 percent 
confidence interval in [0.07; 0.24]) in the same direction.14 Considering that the political space is fairly crowded 
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with parties, such a shift is certainly meaningful and again in support of the Democratic Parties Hypothesis. 
The effects of the additional variables we add to the model are all in line with our theoretical expectations. 
First, intra-party democracy on its own is not linked to a more leftist or rightist policy position as shown by its 
statistically insignificant coefficient. Second, the median voter position exerts a substantively and statistically 
significant effect on parties’ choice of policy positions. Third, more rightist party supporters draw parties to the 
right, yet not statistically significantly so. Moreover, in contrast to Lehrer (2012), we do not report that internal 
democracy emphasizes this effect (see also Schumacher et al., 2013). The difference in results between our study 
and Schumacher et al. (2013) or Lehrer (2012) is likely to be driven by differences in the underlying sample data, 
and model specification.15 Fourth, a party’s past policy position determines its current position quite strongly and 
this effect is statistically significant. This suggests that parties do not change their ideology radically over time, 
but remain fairly consistent (Budge, 1994). Fourth, the effect of Economic Globalization is positively linked to 
more rightist policy positions in both models. This variable also lowers the effect of the median voter on parties’ 
positions as the negative and statistically significant effect of the multiplicative specification, Median Voter 
Position*Economic Globalization, indicates (Ward et al., 2011).  
 
Robustness Checks 
Above, we argue that rank-and-file members respond to rival parties’ policy positions. Yet, it is also 
possible that rank-and-file members orient toward the focal party’s direct ideological neighbors or those parties 
that belong to the same ideological bloc (Adams and Somer-Topcu, 2009a; Williams, 2015). To control for these 
possibilities we computed an m-STAR model that enables us to estimate the effects of multiple spatial lags at the 
same time (Hays, Kachi, and Franzese, 2010). In particular, we add two more spatial lags and interact them with 
Intra-Party Democracy.16 The first additional spatial lag is based on the connectivity matrix WBloc, which assigns a 
value of 1 to its elements if a domestic competitor belongs to the same ideological bloc as the focal party (0 
otherwise).17 Second, the elements of WNeighbor receive a value of 1 if two parties have consecutive ranks when 
ranking domestic parties at election e-1 from left to right, and 0 otherwise. All other aspects of modelling are 
unchanged. Table 2 displays the results. 
[Table 2 here] 
Comparing the coefficient of W e-1 in Table 1 with Model 2 (Table 2) shows that there is virtually no 
difference when the additional spatial lags are included. Figure 2, which is based on the same approach underlying 
Figure 1, but based on Model 2, clarifies this. This graph also shows that neither parties from the same ideological 
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bloc nor neighboring parties’ positions affect the focal party’s position – irrespective of whether parties are 
democratic or not. Our conclusions for the Democratic Party Hypothesis are thus unchanged. 
[Figure 2 here] 
As mentioned above, our core analyses rely on a mixture of contemporary data (i.e., data from the election 
year) and data from the year before an election took place. To assess whether this design choice affects the 
robustness of our findings, we also estimated our main model using contemporary data only. As Model 3 (Table 
2) indicates, however, the findings are substantially identical. Hence, the Democratic Party Hypothesis is 
supported even using contemporary data only. 
Moreover, to rule out that outliers drive our results, we computed the residuals from the baseline model 
and re-estimate it while excluding cases that are more than 2.5 standard deviations away from the mean residual. 
Model 4 (Table 2) displays the results when omitting these outliers. Again, though, the changes that occur when 
excluding potential outliers are small and do not affect our conclusion about the Democratic Parties Hypothesis. 
[Figure 3 here] 
Finally, we argue above that parties either allow party members to choose the party leadership or not, and 
depending on this we label parties as democratic or undemocratic. However, among democratic parties there is 
variance in whether the entire membership or only its delegates participate in leadership selection (Kenig, 2009).18 
We make this distinction in Model 5 in Table 2. Figure 3 shows the corresponding marginal effects of rival 
parties’ policy position on the focal party positions for undemocratic parties, democratic parties that let their 
members participate via delegates (Party Conference), and for one-member-one-vote participation (Entire 
Membership). The effects for undemocratic parties and democratic parties that select their party leader in party 
conferences are virtually identical to the baseline model. The estimated marginal effect for parties that let their 
entire membership participate in leadership election is not statistically significant. Though we acknowledge the 
need to investigate this finding more closely, we note that this is beyond the scope of this paper. Moreover, we 
suspect that it is due to the lower number of cases in this category as only 64 of the 300 democratic observations 
in our sample let the entire membership choose the party leadership. Interestingly, however, the point estimate for 
one-member-one-vote systems resembles the estimate of the baseline model well, and thus provides some 
evidence that the Democratic Parties Hypothesis is likely to be supported by a richer dataset. Furthermore, the  
Democratic Parties Hypothesis describes the remaining two categories (i.e., undemocratic parties and parties that 
choose their leaders in party conferences) correctly. 
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Conclusion 
Internally democratic parties respond to shifts in rival parties’ policies in multi-party systems, while 
undemocratic parties do not. These findings are important for our understanding of party competition because they 
highlight the conditions under which parties are responsive to their competitors (e.g., Adams and Somer-Topcu, 
2009a; Williams, 2015). Furthermore, our findings on intraparty organization and responsiveness to rival parties’ 
policies is important for the literature on political representation. Through deliberation among their members, 
democratic parties -- which are thought to take clear policy positions to cater to their specific constituencies -- are 
nevertheless responsive to their rivals (Mair, 2008). Finally, we contribute to the research that examines the 
relationship between intra-party politics and parties’ policy positions (Schofield and Sened, 2005; Lehrer, 2012; 
Schumacher et al., 2013; Meyer, 2013). 
There are several important research questions that remain. We do not study whether party responsiveness 
to rival parties is an effective strategy, namely, whether it helps parties to gain votes in elections (Adams and 
Somer-Topcu, 2009b) or whether it helps them participate in government (Bäck, 2008). There are party system 
implications which also remain unexplored. If all parties in a country adopt similar internal rules, this could have 
numerous implications for how they respond to citizen preferences compared to countries that have parties that 
employ a variety of internal decision-making rules. In short, the study highlights some potential unexplored paths 
through which party systems, as a whole, represent citizen preferences (Ezrow, 2007). Finally, there are research 
questions to explore with respect to policy diffusion (e.g., Elkin and Simmons, 2005). Undemocratic parties 
neither respond to their neighboring parties’ policy positions nor to their ideological bloc members’ positions 
(although we note that they respond to the median voter). Thus it is worth exploring the conditions under which 
undemocratic parties are influenced by their rivals. They may be responsive to governing parties’ policies or to 
parties that perform well in elections.  
While several important questions remain, we nevertheless conclude that democratic parties respond to 
their rival parties’ policies.  
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Figure 1. Marginal Effects of Spatial Lag on Focal Party Policy Position 
 
Notes:  Graph displays point estimates and 90 percent confidence intervals (vertical bars). Estimates pertain to 
short-term effects. Calculations are based on Plümper and Neumayer (2010: 430f) and Table 1. 
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Figure 2. Marginal Effects of Different Spatial Lags (Model 2) 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on Model 2 in Table 2. Points and lines show short-term effects. All lines are 90% 
confidence intervals. Effects are average marginal effects as suggested by Plümper and Neumayer (2010: 430-
431). 
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Figure 3. Marginal Effects of Different Spatial Lags (Model 5) 
 
Notes: Estimates are based on Model 5 in Table 2. Points and lines show short-term effects. All lines are 90% 
confidence intervals. Effects are average marginal effects as suggested by Plümper and Neumayer (2010: 430-
431). 
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Table1. Effects on Parties’ Policy Positions 
 Party Policy 
Position 
 
Model 1 
 
Wye-1 0.006 
           (0.010) 
Intra-Party Democracy           -1.339 
           (1.440) 
Wy e-1*Intra-Party Democracy 0.017* 
           (0.010) 
Median Voter Positiont-1 2.813*** 
           (0.989) 
Intra-Party Democracy *Median Voter Positiont-1 0.166 
           (0.266) 
Party Supporter Positiont-1 0.018 
           (0.081) 
Intra-Party Democracy *Party Supporter Positiont-1           -0.060 
           (0.064) 
Party Positione-1 0.110* 
           (0.064) 
Economic Globalizationt-1 0.160** 
           (0.072) 
Median Voter Positiont-1 *Economic Globalizationt-1           -0.029** 
                (0.014) 
Constant         -12.056** 
           (5.319) 
Observations  376 
Year and Party Fixed Effects  Yes 
Adjusted R2 0.765 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
 
  
25 
 
Table 2. Effects on Parties’ Policy Positions - Robustness Checks 
 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
 m-STAR Contemporary     
Data 
Outliers   
Excluded 
Democracy 
Levels 
Wy e-1 0.002 0.006 0.007 0.007 
 (0.010) (0.010) (0.009) (0.010) 
Intra-Party Democracy -0.530 -1.954 0.491  
 (1.663) (1.456) (1.296)  
Intra Party Dem.: Party Conference    -0.009 
    (1.778) 
Intra Party Dem.: Entire Membership    -3.082 
    (2.359) 
Wy e-1*Intra-Party Democracy 0.021** 0.018* 0.015*  
 (0.011) (0.010) (0.009)  
Wy e-1Bloc 0.018    
 (0.015)    
Wy e-1Bloc*Intra-Party Democracy -0.011    
 (0.018)    
Wy e-1Neighbor 0.017    
 (0.031)    
Wy e-1Neighbor*Intra-Party Democracy -0.035    
 (0.035)    
Wy e-1* Party Conference    0.016 
    (0.0112) 
Wy e-1*Entire Membership    0.010 
    (0.015) 
Party Supporter Position 0.026 0.086 -0.037 0.021 
 (0.089) (0.081) (0.072) (0.034) 
Intra-Party Dem. *Party Supporter Position -0.061 -0.081 0.013  
 (0.071) (0.067) (0.058)  
Party Conference * Party Supporter Position              0.088 
    (0.082) 
Entire Membership *Party Supporter Position    0.023 
    (0.100) 
Median Voter Position 2.741*** 3.457*** 1.994** 3.261*** 
 (1.002) (0.877) (0.920) (1.025) 
Intra-Party Democracy *Median Voter Position 0.066 0.283 -0.212  
 (0.295) (0.268) (0.240)  
Party Conference *Median Voter Position    -0.095 
    (0.315) 
Entire Membership *Median Voter Position    .486 
    (0.490) 
Party Position Last Election 0.109 0.101 0.139** 0.114* 
 (0.067) (0.067) (0.057) (0.065) 
Economic Globalization 0.149** 0.234*** 0.084 0.175*** 
 (0.073) (0.067) (0.067) (0.074) 
Median Voter Position *Economic Globalization -0.026* -0.043*** -0.015 -0.032*** 
 (0.014) (0.013) (0.013) (0.014) 
Year and Party Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Observations 376 373 369 376 
Adjusted R-squared 0.764 0.767 0.808           0.767 
 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1; Standard errors in parentheses. 
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1 Other studies also argue that party responsiveness to the median is conditional, albeit not necessarily 
conditional on party-level characteristics. Ezrow and Hellwig (2014, 2015), for example, contend that parties 
may be less responsive to the median in countries that have high levels of economic globalization or 
corporatism. 
2 Rival parties’ positions are likely to be relevant in multi-party systems only, as competition for government is 
identical to competition for proximity to the median voter in two-party systems (Downs, 1957; Roemer, 2001). 
3 Although there is no systematic data collection on parties’ usage of focus groups or private polling 
firms, there is ample anecdotal evidence highlighting the link between focus groups and party policy in several 
countries; including: Ireland (Sheahan, 2016), Germany (Lehmann, 2016), Austria (ORF, 2014), and the UK 
(BBC, 2014). Finally, there is related evidence in the US (e.g., Jacobs and Shapiro, 1995; Murray and Howard, 
2002). Greer’s (1991) work on partisan realignments shows in this context how polling helps candidates and 
parties avoid “realigning” mistakes when staking out issue positions. 
4 A famous example for this is the German “pizza connection”, i.e., a series of informal dinners by young 
CDU and Bündnis 90/Die Grünen members of parliament (MPs) at an Italian Restaurant in the mid-1990s 
(Finger and Lerch, 2011). Although the formation of a joint coalition has never been the defining aspect, the 
information shared at these meetings helped attending MPs to agree on joint policy positions that sometimes ran 
counter to their parties’ positions (Fischer, 2008). 
5 Arguably, choosing policy stances also depends on who writes, edits, and approves a party’s manifesto 
and how corresponding committees are chosen. We focus on party leadership selection, because we argue that 
party leaders have a significant say in writing party manifestos. Even if they do not immediately participate in 
writing and editing manifestos, party leaders affect the general policy stances as well as the emphasis on certain 
policies and their framings (Poguntke and Webb, 2005; Cross and Blais, 2012). More importantly, however, 
theoretical arguments (Müller and Strøm, 1999: 18) as well as empirical evidence (Lehrer, 2012; see also Meyer, 
2013; Schumacher et al., 2013) suggest that manifestos are tailored to the needs of party leaders’ intra-party 
selectorate. Put differently, even if party rules grant the party leader full autonomy in writing the party platform, 
the selectorate will hold her accountable for the manifesto, and thus the leader caters the manifesto to the 
selectorate’s expectations (Lehrer, 2012). 
6 This is particularly relevant in the context of deliberation that makes participants change their policy 
goals from fulfilling self-interest to finding the optimal solution for society (Cohen, 1989; see also Goeree and 
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Yariv, 2011). And since other parties are likely to represent other groups within society, their arguments are 
relevant to finding the best solution for society that can affect party policy. 
7 The original “rile”-score ranges from -100 to 100. We rescaled it linearly to 1 to 10 to match the scale 
used for measuring the median voter position (see below). 
8 We use the data from Pilet and Cross (2014) first. Missing values are filled up with Cross and Blais’ 
(2012) data. Eventually, we use Katz and Mair’s (1990) data for any remaining missing values. 
9 According  to Kenig’s continuum of party leader selectorates 20 percent of cases in our sample represent 
undemocratic parties. 
10 Below, we also examine other spatial connectivity matrices. 
11 45% of cases use contemporary data. In the section on sensitivity analysis, we show that no substantive 
changes evolve by using contemporary data only. 
12 Ideally, we would use data on party members’ self-placements which, however, are hardly available in 
the surveys we rely on (e.g., most of the Eurobarometer surveys). In those Eurobarometer waves that ask for 
party membership (Schmitt and Scholtz, 2005), we find that the correlation between party members’ and party 
supporters’ self-placements is r=0.91 (p=0.000). We are thus confident that party supporters’ self-placements are 
a reliable proxy for party members’ self-placements. 
13 As a result, we compute instantaneous, i.e., short-term effects. We refrain from computing long-term 
effects (Plümper et al., 2005), because they rely on the assumption that once a party has shifted its position all 
parties’ policy positions remain stable for multiple elections – an assumption we do not wish to justify.   
14 This is based on the method to compute marginal effects of spatial lags discussed above. 
15 Our dataset does not only cover more parties, elections, and countries than both Lehrer (2012), and 
Schumacher et al. (2013), there are also methodological differences. Both studies measure party supporter 
positions – as we do – as the left-right self-placements of survey respondents who intend to vote for a particular 
party. Yet, both studies do not include a measure on rival parties’ positions in their empirical models. As a result, 
a positive correlation between supporter positions and party policy need not imply that parties follow their 
supporters. It may also capture rival parties shifting, for instance, to the right, which makes the focal parties shift 
to the right as well, which in turn makes more rightist voters express an intention to vote for the focal party. 
Since we control for rival parties’ policy shifts, we can disentangle voter responsiveness from rival party 
responsiveness. Our estimates are, thus, more reliable than those in previous studies. 
16 For clarity, we now label the spatial connectivity matrix used in the previous section WAll. 
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17 We follow Adam and Somer-Topcu’s (2009a) definition of ideological blocs. Based on the MAPOR 
coding, we treat parties that belong to the Ecological, Socialist, or Social Democratic party families as “left.” 
Conservative, Christian Democratic or Nationalist parties are considered members of the “right bloc.” Finally, 
liberal parties form the “centrist bloc.” 
18 Among undemocratic parties there is no variance as the membership has no say in any of its forms. 
